During the demonstrations, a concurrent war of narratives over political meanings, leadership and legitimacy unfolded across Iranian opposition media abroad and, in some cases, within international media. Some of these media presented themselves as platforms for opposition groups. However, their disproportionate coverage of the narratives did not merely circulate information but also served as propaganda. This is even more apparent when such coverage shapes visibility, hierarchy and authority among opposition voices.

Here, propaganda is not necessarily the promotion of misinformation or conspiracy theories. It can also take the form of cherry-picked facts that favor certain voices. Propaganda, in this sense, instead of generating false narratives, legitimizes, embellishes and amplifies rumors that are already within society, those most readily believed.

Iranian collective memory still remembers a rumor that was circulated throughout the country by the media in 1979. The rumor that former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s image had appeared on the moon. This was a story that once captivated Iran.

By 2026, subsequent events reinforced these criticisms. During the recent protests, only videos of Pahlavi supporters circulated widely. The other footage showingotherslogans or those clips showing Pahlavi supporters physically attacking and verballyharassing non-monarchists received little to no criticism from the media. Together, these events show a pattern of media gatekeeping that shapes which opposition is seen as acceptable, respectable and credible.

This pattern of elevating a single strongman while marginalizing other voices is not new in Iran. It has a historical lineage. During the Green Movement (2009), Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, both now under house arrest but longtime holders of several high-ranking positions within the regime’s repressive apparatus, were portrayed by Persian diaspora media as the sole leaders of the struggle for freedom. When their highly controversial records were criticized by non-Persian communities, their voices were left unheard. As a result, non-Persian regions did not join the uprisings, and the movement was largely confined to Persian-inhabited areas.

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For example, under Clause 12.6 (page 9) of the pamphlet, his proposed post-regime-change referendum would reduce Iran’s political horizon to a binary choice between monarchy and unitary republic. However, for Kurdish political parties, federalism persists as a core and legitimate democratic objective. But Pahlavi’s unilateral framing risks excluding ethnonational demands for which, decades ago, their non-Persian leaders were imprisoned or executed under the same Pahlavi dynasty.

Another example is Clause 6, Section A (page 7), which stipulates that members of the proposed National Uprising Institution would be appointed by the leader. The pamphlet states that any change to its composition would require a majority vote of the members appointed by the leader. However, this is insufficient and would also require approval from the self-claimed leader. Consequently, the National Uprising Institution has no genuine independence from the leader. This structure creates a model of “nonbinding consultation.” It concentrates final decision-making power in the hands of a single individual. Such a concentration of power, even if framed as transient, carries a risk of reproducing authoritarian patterns.

However, his pamphlet, as well as his public statements, have many issues that need to be questioned, yet the media chooses to be silent about them.

Global media should not serve once again as a megaphone for another Persian authoritarian. In 1979, when the Iranian people voted to approve the Iranian regime, only Kurdistan voted against it. As a result, Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for jihad and sent Iranian military and paramilitary forces to suppress Kurdistan, resulting in widespread massacres.

Today, history is about to repeat itself. The specter of Pahlavi, not on the moon but on the media, sidelines the other non-Persian alternatives. This, again, prevents a democratic future for Iran as a multinational state. As a result, in the most critical phases of the uprisings, these outlets did not convey a sense of being heard among all civilians. Moreover, many critics of the Pahlavi regime expected the media to devote time to questioning Reza Pahlavi’s position on the highly controversial legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty’s human rights violations, or to critically discuss his centralized, leader-centric program outlined in his Emergency Period Pamphlet. But the media largely overlooked this important aspect and instead amplified his voice as that of another Persian strongman. Only after the uprisings waned and his political missteps became apparent did some outlets, belatedly, begin to offer criticism.

If, in the next uprisings, another Persian strongman dominates, the demonstrations will fail again. If the voices of non-Persians are again unheard, no democratic future is possible. And if the media claim to represent “peoples,” they must represent all of them; silence in the face of exclusion is complicity.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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